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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE 1992-93 TERM
Elliot M. Mincberg*
To borrow a phrase, the Supreme Court went "back to the
future" on the First Amendment in 1992-93. Five of the Court's nine
First Amendment decisions went back to issues or principles recently
raised in court rulings over the last few terms, including several on
controversial issues. For example, critics of the Court's 1990
decision severely limiting religious freedom in Employment Division
v. Smith' waited anxiously to see what the Court would do with the
Free Exercise Clause claim in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah.2 Advocates of decreased protection for church-
state separation, who failed in last term's graduation prayer decision
in Lee v. Weisman3 to overrule the traditional church-state separation
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 hoped for better results from a pair of
cases raising church-state issues.5  And one year after ruling
unconstitutional a so-called "hate speech" ordinance in R.A. V. v. St.
Paul,6 the Court considered the constitutionality of a law enhancing
criminal penalties for "hate crimes" in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.7
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
' 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
4 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
' Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)
and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). See discussion
infra parts I.A, I.B.
6 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
7 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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Anyone who expected major shifts in First Amendment
doctrine from the Court in these cases, however, was clearly
disappointed. Instead, the Court generally reaffirmed its prior
decisions, explained carefully their limits, and applied the relevant
principles to new situations. In Mitchell, for example, the Court
reaffirmed R.A. V., made clear that it proscribed "hate speech" and
not necessarily other laws punishing conduct with discriminatory
intent, and upheld Wisconsin's "hate crime" penalty enhancement
statute.' In Lamb's Chapel and in Zobrest, the Court did not alter
fundamental church-state doctrine, and indeed appeared to reaffirm
the Lemon test, despite Justice Scalia's protest.9 In Hialeah, the
Court majority reaffirmed Smith, but made clear that its prior
decision does not insulate laws targeted at religion from strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment.'1 And in another decision revisiting
recently ruled-upon First Amendment issues, the Court applied a key
part of the "Son of Sam" decision" to commercial speech in
invalidating a law limiting commercial newsracks in Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network.'2
The Court appeared to achieve a considerable degree of
consensus on many of these issues. For example, not a single justice
dissented in Lamb's Chapel, Hialeah, or Mitchell. Beneath this level
of agreement, however, lie clear differences among the justices on
First Amendment doctrine. For instance, several members of the
Court, led by Justice Scalia, continue to oppose Lemon and support
a significant shift in governing church-state principles, producing a
sardonic concurrence by Justice Scalia in Lamb's Chapel criticizing
the majority's invocation of Lemon in its decision. 3 On the other
hand, Justice Souter joined Justices O'Connor and Blackmun this
term in Hialeah in criticizing Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Smith, and specifically called upon the Court to reconsider the Smith
See discussion infra part III.A.
9 See discussion infra parts I.A, I.B.
'0 See discussion infra part I.C.
11 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501 (1991).
12 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). See discussion infra part II.A.
13 See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-51.
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rule in an appropriate future case. 4 And in the Court's three
commercial speech decisions, significant differences were reflected
among the Justices on the level and type of First Amendment
protection to be accorded to commercial speech. 5
This term's First Amendment decisions also shed further light
on the judicial philosophies of the Court's newest justices. Justice
Kennedy has continued to demonstrate sensitivity to free expression
concerns, as exemplified by his dissent in Alexander v. United
States 6 on the application of RICO to First Amendment activities, but
tended this term to side with conservative justices such as Justice
Scalia on religion issues.1 7 As in Lee v. Weisman18 last year, Justice
Souter has emerged as a careful, effective, independent voice on
religion issues, providing a powerful intellectual and judicial
counterweight to the views of Justice Scalia, as demonstrated by his
concurring opinion in Hialeah.9 Justice Thomas has continued the
pattern begun last term of agreeing in virtually every case with the
views of Justice Scalia and Rehnquist on First Amendment issues.
Next term the Court will welcome another new Justice, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who arrives with a reputation as a careful, moderate jurist
with sensitivity towards First Amendment concerns.20
The remainder of this article will analyze in greater detail
each of the Court's nine First Amendment decisions during the 1992-
93 term. These rulings are divided below into three categories:
religion cases, commercial speech cases, and free press and other free
expression cases.
" See infra text accompanying notes 79-85; see also Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2240
(1993).
IS See infra part II.
'6 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2776 (1993).
17 See, e.g., Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2462; Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149.
" 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
" 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring).
See Peter W. Huber & Richard Taranto, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Judge's Judge,
WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A18; REPORT OF PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY
ACTION FUND ON THE NOMINATION OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG TO THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT, July 14, 1993, at 1-2, 15-21.
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L Decisions on Freedom of Religion and Separation of Church
and State
In 1992-93, the Court issued three decisions relating to
religious freedom and the First Amendment. Although the decisions
did not alter fundamental doctrine on free exercise of religion and
church-state separation, they did produce important rulings in these
areas, as well as on free expression issues.
A. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that a New York
school district's refusal to allow an evangelical church to use school
facilities after hours for a religiously oriented film series on family
values and child rearing violated the First Amendment's Freedom of
Speech Clause.2" The Court's decision also has important
implications for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Under New York Law, local school boards are authorized to
allow the use of school property after hours for any of ten permitted
purposes.22 Among the specified purposes is the convening of
"social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other
uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such meetings,
entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the
general public. "23 Because meetings for "[r]eligious purposes are not
included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be
used"'24 under the law, a New York appellate court in Trietley v.
Board of Education of Buffalo, 2 ruled that student Bible clubs cannot
meet on school property under state law. Trietley has been
21 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993).
22 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414(1)(a)-(t) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
23 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414(1)(c) (MeKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
2 Trietley v. Board of Educ., 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (App. Div. 1978).
25 Id.
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considered an authoritative interpretation of state law, both in
subsequent cases and by the Attorney General of New York.26
Pursuant to the prevailing interpretation of section 414, the
Board of Education of the Center Moriches Union Free School
District issued regulations allowing several of the possible ten
authorized uses of school property, including use for social, civic,
and recreational purposes.27 In addition, the district enacted a rule
which states that the premises shall not "be used by any group for
religious purposes."28
Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church in Center Moriches,
twice petitioned the school for permission to use school facilities after
hours. The Church wished to show a film series urging a return to
traditional, Christian family values. The district denied the church's
application, on the grounds that the "'film does appear to be church
related and therefore your request must be refused."'29 Although the
church's second petition described the film as a "'Family oriented
movie-from the Christian perspective,"' the district denied the
second application on identical grounds.3"
The Church filed suit in federal district court, claiming that
the district's denial violated the Free Speech and Assembly clauses,
the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The
district court rejected these allegations. The court characterized the
school, in which religious uses were not permitted, as a limited
public forum. The court further noted that religion was not among
the enumerated purposes allowed under state law; in fact, the district
rules explicitly prohibited such use. In light of the fact that the
church admitted that it wanted to show the film for religious
purposes, and because the school was not open to other similar
organizations for religious purposes, the court concluded that the
2 See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144.
r Id.
28 Id.
" Id. at 2145 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 84).
3o Id. (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. 91). The Church had also requested
permission to use school facilities for religious services, but that request was dropped
and was not the subject of the litigation considered by the Court. Id. at 2144 n.2.
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school district's prohibition was viewpoint neutral.3 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects, adding
that since the school was a limited public forum, exclusions need only
be reasonable and viewpoint neutral in order to satisfy the
Constitution. 2
The Supreme Court applied the same basic test as that used
by the lower courts, but reached a different conclusion. In an
opinion by Justice White for six members of the Court, the Court
found that the district's rule excluding religious uses was
unconstitutional as applied. The lower courts had treated a Christian
presentation on family values as a wholly different subject from
secular treatments of the same issues. According to the Supreme
Court, the lower courts' inquiry was skewed. The subject matter
(family values) was permissible according to the school's own
criteria; according to the Court, the school could not then exclude
certain viewpoints, even religious ones. Citing Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. , the Court concluded:
Although a speaker may be excluded from a non-
public forum if he wishes to address a topic not
encompassed within the purpose of the forum ... or
if he is not a member of the class of speakers for
whose special benefit the forum was created . . . the
government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point
of view he espouses on an otherwise includible
subject.
3 4
"Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1991). The district court had previously rejected the Church's claim that the
district's actions violated the Establishment Clause by demonstrating hostility towards
religion and advancing "nonreligion." Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 736 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
32 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 386 (2d
Cir. 1992).
33 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
' Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
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The Supreme Court relied upon Widmar v. Vincent,35 which
concerned use of college facilities by a religious group, in analyzing
the question of whether permitting the Church's use of school
facilities would violate the Establishment Clause. The Court
explained that in Lamb 's Chapel, similar to Widmar, the showing of
the film would have been after school hours, would not have been
sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public at
large, not just church members. Thus, while avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation may constitute a compelling
government interest justifying restriction of speech rights, the Court
suggested, there was little danger that the community would think that
the school was endorsing religion. Furthermore, as in Widmar, the
Court found that allowing presentation of the film would not violate
the tripartite test advanced in Lemon v. Kurtzman.36 "The challenged
governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and
does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. "37
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
conclusion that the New York education law as applied and the
district's exclusion of Lamb's Chapel violated the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment, and that thus there was no "realistic danger"
that allowing the Church to show the films in question would violate
the Establishment Clause.3" However, they vigorously objected to the
majority's reasoning with respect to the Establishment Clause claim
and its invocation of the Lemon test. Justice Scalia's opinion
ridiculed Lemon, suggesting that like a "ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried," the Lemon test was "stalk[ing]
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence" and "frightening little
children and school attorneys of Center Moriches."39 According to
" 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
36 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
" Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. The Court also rejected the school district's
claims that avoiding the possibility of disorder or use of facilities for other than broad
public benefit justified exclusion of the Church, noting that these purported rationales
were not supported by the record. Id. at 2148-49.
m Id. at 2149.
39 Id.
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Justice Scalia, granting access to Lamb's Chapel could not violate the
Establishment Clause because it would not "signify state or local
embrace of a particular religious sect."4 ° While expressing no
specific view as to Justice Scalia's proposed standard, Justice
Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion objecting to the majority's
reliance on Lemon and its use of the phrase "endorsing religion" as
a criterion for evaluating Establishment Clause claims.41
Significantly, the majority of the Court appeared to clearly
reject the concurring justices' criticism of Lemon and "endorsement"
for Establishment Clause purposes. The opinion by Justice White,
who himself has criticized Lemon in the past,42 specifically relied
upon Lemon and responded to Justice Scalia by noting pointedly that
"there is a proper way to inter an established decision" and that
Lemon "has not been overruled. "43 Despite the continuing efforts of
advocates both on and off the Court, the majority of the Court has
thus continued to adhere to traditional standards for evaluating
Establishment Clause claims.
B. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,' the Supreme
Court held 5-4 that providing a sign-language interpreter for a deaf
student at a Roman Catholic high school did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The case began when the parents of James
Zobrest, a deaf student, requested that the Catalina Foothills school
district provide him with a sign-language interpreter at a Roman
Catholic high school. When the school district declined to provide
an interpreter to Zobrest, based in part on its conclusion that doing
4
0oId. at 2151.
" Id. at 2149. For further discussion of the differing views on the Court on these
issues in the context of last year's school graduation prayer case, Lee v. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. 2649 (1992), see Elliot M. Mineberg, The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment: The 1991-92 Term, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 1, 60-65 (1992).
42 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
41 113 S. Ct. at 2148 n.7. Interestingly, the majority opinion was also joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist who has severely criticized Lemon. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at
107-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
- 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
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so would violate the Establishment Clause, Zobrest filed suit under
both the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),45 and the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.
The district court granted summary judgment for the school
district, on the grounds that the requested relief would constitute an
impermissible entanglement of church and state. "The interpreter
would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of
James-thereby, promoting James' religious development at
government expense." 46 The court of appeals affirmed by a divided
vote. 47 Applying the tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman," the court
found that this application of IDEA would have the primary effect of
advancing religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause and the
second prong of the Lemon test. 49  The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The first question addressed by the Supreme Court in Zobrest
was whether to reach the constitutional issue at all. The four
dissenting Justices (Blackmun, Souter, Stevens and O'Connor)
vigorously argued that the Court should not do so, based on the
presence of several potential nonconstitutional grounds to dispose of
the case.
Initially, as Justice Blackmun explained, the case could have
been resolved by interpreting the IDEA, in accord with several lower
courts, to mean that the government need not provide interpreters at
private schools at all, so long as a student like Zobrest could have
been educated through an appropriate special education program at a
public school."0 In addition, as one lower court had held, a federal
4' 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1484 (1993).
4 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
4' 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992).
4 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
49 The dissenting judge on the court of appeals argued that "[gleneral welfare
programs neutrally available to all children," are constitutional "because their benefits
diffuse over the entire population." Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1199 (Tang, J., dissenting).
50 See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun
noted, both the United States as amicus curiae and several lower courts have endorsed
the view that the IDEA itself does not establish an individual entitlement to services for
students placed in private schools at their parents' option. Id. See, e.g., Goodall v.
Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 188
(1991); McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 872 F.2d
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regulation prohibiting the use of IDEA funds for religious worship,
instruction, or proselytization would arguably forbid the relief sought
by Zobrest independent of the dictates of the Establishment Clause." l
Particularly since these questions would have to be resolved at some
point anyway, the dissent maintained that the Court should have
avoided ruling on the constitutional issue, and remanded for
determination of the statutory and regulatory issues. As Justice
O'Connor noted, it is a "fundamental rule of judicial restraint" that
the Supreme Court should "not reach constitutional issues in advance
of the need for deciding them. "52
The majority nevertheless decided to reach the Establishment
Clause issue, claiming that because the lower courts addressed the
constitutional claim, it was proper for the Court to do so as well.
"The fact that there may be buried in the record a nonconstitutional
ground for decision," Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
claimed, is "not by itself enough to invoke this rule.""
The majority began its analysis of the constitutional claim
by articulating its view of the limits of the Establishment Clause.
The Court explained that the Constitution does not forbid
"government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class
of citizens defined without reference to religion ...just because
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."
The Court invoked Mueller v. Allen,' and Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,55 as seminal cases dealing with
government programs offering general educational aid and the
Establishment Clause. 6 The Court emphasized that in both Witters
153 (6th Cir. 1989).
51 See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2470 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing GoodaU, 930
F.2d at 363).
s2 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Three Affiliated
Tribes v. World Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)).
11 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466.
5 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to state law
permitting taxpayers to take deductions for certain educational expenses, most of which
benefitted parents sending children to private schools, in computing state income taxes).
" 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding vocational assistance program providing aid to
individual disabled students where blind student utilized aid to attend a private Christian
college).
56 Id.
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and Mueller, three important characteristics rendered permissible the
allocation of public funds to students who attended sectarian schools.
First, the benefits were provided to a broad spectrum of individuals,
without regard to the sectarian or nonsectarian nature of their
educational activities.57 Second, the public funds were received by
sectarian schools solely as a result of "'private choices of individual
parents of school-age children,"' not through "'the direct transmission
of assistance from the state to the schools themselves.'""' Finally,
the programs in Witters and Mueller did not advance religion because
they did not create a financial incentive for students to choose a
sectarian education.59
The majority then applied the reasoning in Witters and
Mueller to the facts at hand to conclude that the Court of Appeals
erred in its decision. The majority found that the facts in Zobrest
presented an even slimmer chance of offending the Establishment
Clause than in cases like Witters and Mueller, since "no funds
traceable to the government ever found their way into sectarian
school coffers. "'  The majority noted that "the only indirect
economic benefit a sectarian school might receive by dint of the
IDEA is the handicapped child's tuition," and even that benefit would
occur only if the school "makes a profit on each student," if "without
an IDEA interpreter, the child would have gone to school elsewhere,"
and if "the school then would have been unable to fill the child's
spot. "61
The school district sought to distinguish Zobrest from Mueller
and Witters, relying on the fact that supplying an interpreter would
mean that a district employee would be physically present at Salpointe
in order to advance Zobrest's religious education. The district argued
that based on these facts, the Court should rule in its favor following
Meek v. Pittenger6 2 and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.
63
51 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
s Id. at 2467 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)).
'9 Id. at 2467 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488 (1986)).
60 Id. at 2467-68.
61 Id. at 2468.
6 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (invalidating a statute providing aid to private sectarian
schools through a direct loan of teaching materials and equipment).
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The majority distinguished Meek and Ball on several grounds.
First, the programs in Meek and Ball were direct grants of
government aid which "relieved sectarian schools of costs they
otherwise would have borne in educating their students," in contrast
to Zobrest where private schools were merely "incidental
beneficiaries. "' In addition, the Court suggested that an interpreter's
task differs substantially from that of a teacher or guidance counselor.
While a teacher or guidance counselor presumably alters the school
environment, an interpreter's task is simply to translate whatever
material is being presented to the entire class.65 Accordingly, the
majority concluded that the Establishment Clause did not forbid even
the placement of a public employee in a sectarian school under the
circumstances of Zobrest.66
In addition to the dissent on procedural grounds joined by
four Justices, Justices Blackmun and Souter dissented on the merits
of the constitutional claim. "Until now," Justice Blackmun wrote, the
Court had never "authorized a public employee to participate directly
in religious indoctrination. "67 But "[a]t Salpointe, where the secular
and the sectarian are 'inextricably intertwined,' governmental
assistance to the educational function of the school necessarily entails
government participation in the school's inculcation of religion. "68
Accordingly, the dissent maintained, the translation of the religious
message by a state sponsored employee is unconstitutional.69
Justice Blackmun contended that Witters and Mueller were
distinguishable on their facts. Those cases, Justice Blackmun
explained, dealt with the payment of cash or a tax deduction, where
governmental involvement ended with the disbursement of funds or
lessening of tax. "70 Zobrest, on the other hand, "involves ongoing,
6 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (declaring programs in which public employees taught classes
in religious school classrooms unconstitutional).
64 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469.
s Id. at 2469. As the majority noted, according to ethical guidelines, interpreters
are required to "transmit everything that is said in exactly the same way that it was
intended." Id.
6Id.
7 Id. at 2471 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6' Id. at 2472.
9 Id. at 2474.
70 Id.
[Vol. XI
1993] SUPREME COURT: 1992-93 TERM 91
daily and intimate governmental participation in the teaching and
propagation of religious doctrine."71 The dissent contended that it
would be dangerous for the state to allow the presence of the
interpreter at Salpointe because the state employees's presence would
lead to a perceived endorsement of religion.72 The "graphic symbol
of the concert of church and state that results when a public employee
or instrumentality mouths a religious message is likely to enlist-at
least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters-the powers of
government to support the religious denomination supporting the
school.""
Justice Blackmun's dissent carefully explained how the
majority in Zobrest permitted a form of indirect state assistance to
religion that cannot be fully justified by the Court's previous
decisions. Yet the claims from religious right advocates and others
that greeted the decision, suggesting that Zobrest is a "slam dunk" for
proponents of voucher programs and represents a major retreat from
church-state principles, are simply false.74 The majority was careful
to emphasize the specific facts in Zobrest, including the fact that the
interpreter functioned simply in a mechanistic manner and did nothing
more than translate what was said. The Court's opinion emphasized
that any aid to religion resulting from this ruling would be minor and
incidental. The majority also sought to tie its ruling closely to prior
decisions like Mueller and Witters and to suggest that the holding in
Zobrest goes no further than prior decisions and upsets no precedents.
Coupled with the endorsement of Lemon by a clear majority of the
Court in Lamb's Chapel, as discussed above, the net result is that the
Court'has not altered and has indeed reaffirmed existing church-state
principles, making it clear that each case raising such issues must be
carefully examined on its own facts.
Indeed, even after the Court's rulings in Zobrest and Lamb's
Chapel, continued litigation on church-state issues appears inevitable.
On the same day that it decided Lamb's Chapel, for example, the
Court denied certiorari in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School
71 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474.
72 Id.
73 Id. (quoting Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385).
74 See Robert Boston, Hearing Loss: State-Paid Hearing Interpreter For Catholic
Student Approved, CHURCH & STATE, July/Aug. 1993, at 4.
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District,75 a case in which a federal appellate court ruled, despite the
Court's school graduation prayer decision in Lee v. Weisman,76 that
student-led graduation prayer could be constitutional. Even before
the Court's action, religious right and other groups had aggressively
championed Jones, claiming that the decision established a right to
student-led prayer at graduation and announcing a campaign to send
self-described legal "SWAT teams" into school districts that
disagreed.77 The denial of certiorari in Jones was greeted with
further, inaccurate claims that the Supreme Court had somehow
"affirmed" the appellate court ruling, even as other cases raising the
issue work their way through the lower courts.7" Additional Court
rulings in this volatile area can be anticipated in the future.
C. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,9 the Court invalidated city ordinances regulating the use of
animal sacrifice in religious ceremonies. The Court found that the
ordinances were void because they were targeted specifically at
religion and violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye and its congregants
practice the Santeria religion, a faith that originated in the nineteenth
century among Yoruba people brought as slaves to Cuba from Africa,
and which is a fusion of traditional African religion and Roman
Catholicism. The Santeria religion involves animal sacrifice,
performed as an integral part of most ceremonies. 0 In April 1987,
7S 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
76 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
' Michael deCourcy Hinds, Robertson TryingAgain to Put Prayer in Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at A12.
78 Robert Boston, Muddled Message, CHURCH & STATE, July/Aug. 1993 at 9, 10.
'9 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1992).
60 Sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and death rites, for the
cure of the sick, for the initiation of new members and priests, and
during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed in Santeria rituals
include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep
and turtles. The animals are killed by the cutting of the carotid
arteries in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten,
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the Church leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced its
intention to establish a house of worship, a museum, a school and a
cultural center. Ernesto Pichardo, Church president and priest, stated
that the Church's goal was "to bring the practice of the Santeria faith,
including its ritual of animal sacrifice, into the open.""
Many Hialeah residents were distressed by the prospect of
having a Santeria church in their community. In response to this
concern, the city council held an emergency public session on June
9, 1987. At that meeting, and subsequent meetings, the council
enacted a series of ordinances condemning "acts of any and all
religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety" and the "ritual sacrifice of animals," as well as specifically
banning animal sacrifice, unnecessary killing of or cruelty to animals,
and most animal slaughter.82
The Church and Pichardo then filed a federal lawsuit
challenging the enactment of these ordinances on the grounds that
they violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. After trial, the district court ruled for the city, finding
that the neither the Church's nor Pichardo's Free Exercise rights had
been violated.83 The court acknowledged that the ordinances were
not religiously neutral, but found that they were not designed to ban
Santeria from Hialeah and were justified by compelling government
interests. The court identified four compelling interests served by the
ordinances: avoiding substantial health risks posed by the sacrifices,
preventing children who witnessed the sacrifices from being
emotionally injured, avoiding cruel and unnecessary killing of
animals, and ensuring that animal slaughter was restricted to
except after healing and death rituals.
Id. at 2222. Since Santeria adherents frequently are persecuted, particularly in Cuba,
they traditionally worship in secret. Id. at 2222-23.
81 Id. at 2223.
'2 Id. at 2223-24 (citing Hialeah Res. 87-40, 87-52, 87-66, 82-71, 87-72, and 87-90).
The resolution banned slaughter except in areas zoned for slaughterhouses and except for
the slaughter of ".small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an
exception provided for by state law." Id. at 2224.
83 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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appropriately zoned areas.4 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion."5
Although the Supreme Court could not agree on a single
opinion in Hialeah, all nine Justices agreed that the lower courts were
wrong and that the decision should be reversed. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, first explained that the
appropriate standard for adjudicating the Church's First Amendment
claim was the standard developed in the controversial decision of
Employment Division v. Smith.86 The majority reaffirmed Smith, but
stated that even under that decision, a law burdening the free exercise
of religion must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest unless it is both neutral and generally
applicable.87 The Court ruled that the Hialeah ordinances failed to
meet that test.88
Initially, the Court explained that under Smith, the Hialeah
ordinances were not neutral towards religion. Although the
ordinances did not discriminate against religion on their face, the
Court noted, facial neutrality was not determinative. If more
circumstantial, subtle indicators document discriminatory intent, the
majority reasoned, a statute is not neutral towards religion. 89 After
examining evidence such as the City's including the references to
religion and ritual in the text of the ordinances, the ordinances effect
on Santeria worship, the fact that virtually the only conduct subject
to all the ordinances was the Santeria religion, and the fact that the
ordinances "proscribe more religious conduct than is necessary to
achieve their needs," the Court concluded that the ordinances were
I d. at 1485-86.
85 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991).
"Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226 (applying Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), which denied unemployment benefits to individuals who had been terminated for
utilizing peyote in religious practice). Snith has been particularly controversial because
the majority opinion in that case substantially reinterpreted prior precedent and ruled that
where laws are neutral on their face and of general applicability, but nonetheless
significantly burden religion, government need not show a compelling interest to justify
them. See Elliot M. Mincberg, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment: The 1989-
90 Term, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4-8 (1990).
87 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
' Id.
s9 Id. at 2227.
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not neutral and were designed to stifle the practice of the Santeria
religion."°
The Court next analyzed the ordinances' constitutionality in
light of the Free Exercise Clause's requirement that laws burdening
religious practice must be of general applicability. Again applying
the standard articulated in Smith, the Court reasoned that the
ordinances were not of general applicability because they were
underinclusive by failing to proscribe hunting and other non-religious
killing of animals which implicated the same public health and animal
humaneness concerns that purportedly justified the ordinances. The
Court thus concluded that "[elach of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the
city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by
religious belief . . . . This precise evil is what the requirement of
general applicability is designed to prevent. "9
Since the ordinances were not neutral and were not of general
applicability, the Court stated, they must satisfy strict scrutiny; that
is, they must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
government interest.92 The Court ruled that the Hialeah ordinances
did not meet this exacting standard, both because they were
underinclusive and overbroad as discussed earlier in the opinion, and
because the same underinclusiveness demonstrated that the
government's interest was not truly compelling. A statute "cannot be
regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order,"' the majority
noted, "when it leaves appreciable damage to that vital interest
unprohibited."93 The Court thus ruled that the Hialeah ordinances
were invalid.
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Justice Scalia objected to the Court's sequential
o Id. at 2231. The Court noted, for example, that "narrower regulation" than the
prohibitions in the ordinances could have achieved the city's interests in preventing
cruelty to animals and protecting public health. Id. at 2230. While the majority stated
that "adverse impact" alone does not demonstrate impermissible discrimination against
religion, such impact does provide important evidence. Id. at 2228. Justice Kennedy,
in a portion of his opinion joined only by Justice Stevens, suggested that statements by
council members and residents also provided relevant evidence of intent. Id. at 2230-31.
"' Id. at 2233.
2 Id.
9' Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2234 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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and divided analysis of neutrality and general applicability, suggesting
that these terms "substantially overlap."' Justice Scalia specifically
objected to the portion of the Court's opinion that analyzed the
lawmakers' subjective motivation as to whether they "intended to
disfavor" Santeria. 95 According to Justice Scalia, it is virtually
impossible to determine a legislative body's "intent," and the Court
should generally refrain from such inquiries. Accordingly, under the
Free Exercise Clause, the proper inquiry requires determining
whether a law's effect disfavors religion. Within this framework,
Scalia concluded that regardless of the legislature's intention, the
ordinances' clear effect was to suppress Santeria worship, rendering
them invalid.96
Justice Souter wrote a lengthy concurring opinion focusing on
the Smith case itself. Although Souter concurred in the holding that
the Hialeah ordinances were invalid, he wrote separately "to explain
why the Smith rule is not germane to this case and to express my
view that, in a case presenting the issue, the Court should re-examine
the rule Smith declared. 
97
Specifically, Justice Souter did not object to the well-
established principle, expressed in Smith, that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits regulations which suppress religious freedom through
laws which are not neutral or generally applicable. Instead, he
objected to the Smith rule that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion
results from enforcing a 'neutral, generally applicable' law, the Free
Exercise clause has not been offended." 8  Similar to Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith itself, which criticized the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Souter cogently analyzed
precedent prior to Smith and demonstrated that Smith contradicts
previous cases clearly holding that "formal neutrality and general
applicability are not sufficient conditions for free exercise
constitutionality." 99 Souter expressed concern that it is difficult to
I d. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
s Id. at 2239-40.
Id. at 2240
97 Id. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter was not a member of the
Court when Smith was decided.
98 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2240.
9 Id. at 2243.
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remain faithful to traditional Free Exercise jurisprudence and still
apply Smith to cases which, unlike Hialeah, do not provide such clear
and rare examples of laws specifically aimed at religious
suppression. "0
Justice Souter also objected to the distinction drawn in Smith
between hybrid cases involving "the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press," and other free exercise claims.1 °1 As
Justice Souter explained, this "hybrid case" exception to Smith either
has no meaning at all, since the litigant could rely on the other
constitutional protection without regard to the Free Exercise Clause,
or it refers to claims in which other constitutional rights are merely
implicated, in which case it would become "so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule.""0 2 Justice Souter's concern about Smith's consistency
with previous law led him specifically to urge re-examination of both
the merits of the Smith rule and its precedential weight in an
appropriate future case. Justice Souter noted that because the Smith
rule was unnecessary to resolve the question in Smith itself, and was
announced without briefing or argument specifically addressed to that
issue, its precedential force was weakened."0 3 In addition, he
expressed particular concern about the fact that although Smith is at
least arguably in tension with prior law, it did not explicitly overrule
these prior, contradictory cases, creating a serious question as to
which precedent to follow.'"
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, also concurred
in the judgment. Blackmun and O'Connor argued for the stricter
standard of review espoused in the Smith dissent: that a statute
burdening the Free Exercise of religion "'may stand only if the law
in general, and the State's refusal to allow a religious exemption in
particular, are justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served
o Id. at 2240-50.
10 Id. at 2244-45.
102 Id. at 2245.
"3 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2247.
104 Id. at 2248.
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by any less restrictive means."' 105 Blackmun then continued his
analysis by reiterating that Smith was wrongly decided."°
In accordance with his objections to Smith, Justice Blackmun
applied different reasoning than the majority to reach the conclusion
that the Hialeah ordinances were unconstitutional. He agreed that the
ordinances were both overinclusive and underinclusive, and further
stated that "[w]hen a law discriminates against religion as such, as do
the ordinances in this case, it automatically will fail strict scrutiny
under Sherbert v. Verner."107
The concerns about the state of Free Exercise jurisprudence
expressed in the concurring opinions in Hialeah indicate that the fate
of the Smith standard is unclear. On the Court itself, with the
retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall who dissented in Smith,
only three Justices (O'Connor, Blackmun, and Souter) remain who
appear to disagree with the rationale of Smith; even assuming that
Justice Ginsburg joins that group, a majority of five appears to
support Smith. Congress, however, has enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act,' legislation which may restore the pre-
Smith free exercise standard as a matter of federal statutory laws. 0 9
More judicial activity in this area is thus quite likely in the future.
IL Commercial Speech Decisions
The Court issued three rulings in 1992-93 concerning whether
particular types of commercial speech are protected by the First
Amendment. Two decisions represented progress for those who
advocate such protection; a third decision took one step back.
105 Id. at 2250 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 907).
Io d. at 2250-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Io d. at 2251 (citing Shebert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
0 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993).
1o See High Court Rules in Favor of Religious Activity, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY REP.
1487, 1487 (1993).
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A. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network
In Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,1 ° the Court struck down
a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills
in newsracks. In February 1990, the Cincinnati City Council passed
a motion requiring the city's Department of Public Works to enforce
an existing ordinance forbidding the distribution of commercial
handbills on public property."' t As a result, the city revoked the
permits it had issued to Discovery Network and Harmon Publishing,
both of which distributed commercial handbills in newsracks located
on city sidewalks. This action, which the city claimed was designed
to improve the safety and aesthetic appearance of the city's streets,
would have had the effect of removing sixty-two of the more than
1,500 newsracks on Cincinnati streets."'
The district court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Boggs took an expansive view
of the Supreme Court's commercial speech precedents. He found
that while commercial speech was entitled to lesser protection than
political or other speech, this was so only where government acts to
limit the distinctive harmful effects that commercial speech might
cause. Thus, while government is free to regulate false or misleading
commercial speech, the court suggested that unless there is something
harmful that derives from the commercial nature of the speech in
"o 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
". Id. at 1508 n.2. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE § 714-1-c (1992) defines
a commercial handbill as:
any printed or written matter, dodger, circular, leaflet, pamphlet,
paper, booklet or any other printed or otherwise reproduced original
or copies of any matter of literature:
(a) Which advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity
or thing; or
(b) Which directs attention to any business or mercantile or
commercial establishment, or other activity, for the purpose of
directly promoting the interest thereof by sales; or
(c) Which directs the attention to or advertises any meeting,
theatrical performance, exhibition or event of any kind for which an
admission fee is charged for the purpose of private gain or profit.
112 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1508.
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question, even commercial speech is entitled to the full protection of
the First Amendment.
1 13
The Supreme Court-divided by a 6-3 margin-affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's judgment, but Justice Stevens' carefully written
majority opinion stopped short of endorsing the broad reasoning of
the lower court. Because the Court found the Cincinnati ordinance
unconstitutional under the more traditional framework by which it has
examined First Amendment challenges to regulation of commercial
speech, it saw no need to pass on Judge Boggs' broader reasoning.
1 14
As the Court noted, the leading case governing commercial
speech regulation is Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York." 5 Under the test set out in Central
Hudson, a court reviewing regulation of commercial speech needs to
address four questions:
At the outset, we must determine whether the
expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the government
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.
11 6
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test-whether the
regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve the government's
substantial interest-was further refined in Board of Trustees of the
State University of New York v. Fox. "' The Fox Court explained that
" Discovery Network v. Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464, 469-70 (6th Cir. 1991)("Our
examination of [the Court's commercial speech] jurisprudence shows that the lesser value
placed on commercial speech only justifies regulations dealing with the content of the
speech itself, or with the distinctive effects that the content of the speech will produce.").
"4 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1516.
"l 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
116 Id. at 566.
1' 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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this requirement did not mean that government regulation must
employ the least restrictive means necessary to achieve its objective.
Instead, the Court said that a "reasonable fit" is all that is required:
"a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.""' The
Court explained that "[wIithin those bounds we leave it to
governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may
be best employed."" 9
In Discovery Network, the Court held that the Cincinnati
council failed the fourth prong of Central Hudson, as refined by
Fox. 2 ' "It was the city's burden to establish a 'reasonable fit'
between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice
of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means
chosen to serve those interests." 'M The city, however, failed to meet
this burden:
The ordinance on which it relied was an outdated
prohibition against the distribution of any commercial
handbills on public property. It was enacted long
before any concern about newsracks developed. Its
apparent purpose was to prevent the kind of visual
blight caused by littering, rather than any harm
associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing
devices. The fact that the city failed to address its
recently developed concern about newsracks by
regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number
indicates that it has not "carefully calculated" the
costs and benefits associated with the burden on
speech imposed by its prohibition. The benefit to be
derived from the removal of sixty-two newsracks
while about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was
considered "minute" by the District Court and
"paltry" by the Court of Appeals. We share their
SId. at 480.
119 Id.
120 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510.
121 Id.
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evaluation of the "fit" between the city's goal and its
method of achieving it."'
The Court added that despite the language used in other
opinions suggesting that legislative judgments in this area are entitled
to some deference,123 the determination of whether there is a
"reasonable fit""u between the government's objective and the means
employed is not "mere rational basis review.0 25  If "there are
numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction
on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in
determining whether the 'fit' between the ends and means is
reasonable. "126
In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that
commercial speech was entitled to substantial First Amendment
protection.12 Cincinnati, in essence, argued that its decision to bar
only "commercial" newsracks from the city's streets was
"reasonable" because of the relatively low value placed on such
speech.1 28 The Court rejected this claim. "In our view, the city's
argument attaches more importance to the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and
seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech. "129
In examining the "reasonableness" of the fit, the Court also
looked to the extent to which the distinction that the city
drew-between commercial and noncommercial speech-related to the
city's interest in aesthetics and safety.130 Because "the distinction
bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the
1n Id.
12 See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 478 ("[W]e have been loath to second-guess the
Government's judgment. ").
12 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1509.
12' Id. at 1510 n.13.
126 Id.
1 id. at 1512.
12 id. at 1511.
129 Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511.
10 Id. at 1510.
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city has asserted," it is "an impermissible means of responding to the
city's admittedly legitimate interests. "131
In support of the principle articulated by the Court-that the
category of speech that government chooses to regulate in the service
of a legitimate interest needs to bear some relationship to that
interest-the Court relied on Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
the New York State Crime Victims Board. 32 In that case, the Court
struck down a New York law requiring income earned by an accused
or convicted criminal, derived from works describing the crime, be
turned over to an escrow account held by 4the Crime Victims Board,
which in turn would pay the money to compensate the victims of the
crime. 33 While the Court recognized that the state had a compelling
interest in ensuring that crime victims are compensated by those who
injure them, it had no legitimate interest in distinguishing between
income derived from protected speech and other forms of income.1
34
In this sense, the law challenged in Simon & Schuster was
underinclusive. If the government is going to choose a category of
speech to regulate, the Court reasoned, the line it draws between
regulated and unregulated speech must serve the government's
purported interest.' 3' The Cincinnati law at issue in Discovery
Network had this same flaw. While the city did have a legitimate
interest in safety and aesthetics, the distinction that the city drew
between commercial and noncommercial speech had nothing to do
with this admittedly legitimate interest.
The Court next addressed the question of whether the ban
should be upheld as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction. Because "the very basis for the regulation is the
difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial
speech," the Court found, the Cincinnati ordinance cannot be seen as
such a content-neutral restriction. 136
'Id. at 1514.
"3 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
133 id.
" Id. at 511; see Elliot M. Mincberg, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment:
The 1991-92 Term, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4-10 (1992).
135 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509 (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
"6 Id. at 1516.
103
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Justice Blackmun concurred, calling on the Court to reject the
Central Hudson four-part inquiry, and instead to accord the full
protection of the First Amendment to "truthful, noncoercieve
commercial speech concerning lawful activities. "137 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Thomas, dissented.
According to the Chief Justice, there was a "reasonable fit" between
the city's ordinance and its goal of improving the safety and
aesthetics of the city.' 3 Thus, he claimed, the city's prohibition was
sufficiently related to its efforts to alleviate problems caused by
newsracks, since "every newsrack that is removed from the city's
sidewalks marginally enhances the safety of its streets and esthetics
of its cityscape. ""' According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
majority decision requires the city to choose between restricting more
speech by newspapers, which is more clearly entitled to the full
protection of the First Amendment, and allowing commercial
newsracks to proliferate on its street corners.4
B. Edenfield v. Fane
The Court further elaborated on the protection to be accorded
commercial speech in Edenfield v. Fane,"4' where it struck down a
Florida regulation forbidding a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
from engaging in direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation of potential
clients. While the Court had upheld similar restrictions on lawyer
solicitation,'42 the Court in Edenfield, speaking through Justice
Kennedy, found the bar on account solicitations to be
distinguishable. "I
Florida justified its ban on solicitation on the grounds that
CPAs who solicited clients are "obviously in need of business and
17 id. at 1517 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 1522 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 1523.
'4o Id. at 1525
141 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
142 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
'43 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802.
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may be willing to bend the rules. "1" According to the State's view,
a CPA who solicits clients "will be beholden to him," and "the
independence of CPAs performing the attest function, which involves
the rendering of opinions on a firm's financial statements," will
therefore be endangered.14 In addition to this concern for
independence, the State asserted an interest in privacy, claiming that
the ban was needed to prevent "overreaching and vexatious conduct
by the CPA." 1"
The ban was struck down by a Florida district court, whose
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.147 The Supreme Court, with only Justice O'Connor
dissenting, agreed with both lower courts. 148
The Court explained that the permissibility of regulation of
commercial speech turns on the application of the Central Hudson
test, under which the Court asks, inter alia, "whether the State's
interests in proscribing [commercial speech] are substantial" and
"whether the challenged regulation advances these interests in a direct
and material way. "149 While the interests asserted in Edenfield were
substantial, the Court concluded that the ban did not sufficiently
advance those interests to survive constitutional challenge. 5 °
The Court found that the State failed to demonstrate that the
ban "advances its asserted interests in any direct and material
way."1'  The State put forward no evidence that allowing personal
solicitation of prospective clients by CPAs presents any danger of
overreaching or compromised independence, despite the fact that "21
States place no specific restrictions of any kind on solicitation by
CPAs, and only three states besides Florida have enacted a
categorical ban."152 Instead, it noted that a report prepared by the
'A Id. at 1797.
145 id.
146 Id.
"4 Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514 (1lth Cir. 1991).
'48 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1795.
149 Id. at 1798 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
"s Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1804.
a Fdenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
IS2 id.
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1981,
on which the state itself relied, found "no reason to suspect that
CPAs who engage in personal solicitation" would be "any more
inclined to compromise their professional standards, than CPAs who
do not solicit, or who solicit only by mail or advertisement. 
1 53
The Court also rejected the argument that such solicitations
were invasive of potential clients' privacy interests." Referring
again to the AICPA report, the Court noted the "absence of
persuasive evidence that direct uninvited solicitation by CPAs is
likely to lead to false or misleading claims or oppressive conduct. "
155
Finally, the Court pointed out the ways in which the ban on
accountant solicitation differed from the prohibitions on attorney
solicitation that it upheld in Ohralik.156 The Ohralik Court relied on
the fact that the "potential for overreaching is significantly greater
when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay
person. "157 According to the Court, these concerns are not present
with respect to CPAs, because "[u]nlike a lawyer, a CPA is not 'a
professional trained in the art of persuasion. "'158 Furthermore, the
"typical client of a CPA is far less susceptible to manipulation than
the young accident victim in Ohralik. "159 While the clients in Ohralik
were "approached at a moment of high stress and vulnerability," the
CPA's potential clients "meet [with] him in their own offices at a
time of their choosing."160 In addition, if they "are unreceptive to his
initial telephone solicitation, they need only terminate the call.
,51 Id. at 1801. In fact, the Court cited to literature on the accounting profession that
suggested that the greatest threats to an accountant's independence come from established
institutional clients, rather than from those being solicited. Id. "It appears from the
literature that a business executive who wishes to obtain a favorable but unjustified audit
opinion from a CPA would be less likely to turn to a stranger who has solicited him than
to pressure his existing CPA, with whom he has an ongoing, personal relation and over
whom he may also have some financial leverage." Id.
'54 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1803.
155 id.
156 Id. at 1802-03.
57 Chralik, 436 U.S. at 465.
158 Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1802 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465).
"9 Id. at 1803.
160 Id.
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Invasion of privacy is not a significant concern. 1 61  The Court
therefore found the ban on accountant solicitation unconstitutional.
1 62
Justice Blackmun, in a one sentence concurrence, joined the
Court's opinion, but again noted that he did not agree "that
commercial speech that is free from fraud or duress or the advocacy
of illegal activity is entitled to only an 'intermediate level' protection"
under the First Amendment.1 63 Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing
that states should have greater authority to regulate "learned
professions.""6 She also objected to the level of generality at which
the Court examined the law. While the Court looked to see whether
the regulation, as applied to Fane, satisfied Central Hudson, it never
"analyzed the rule itself" under that test. 65 Justice O'Connor thus
criticized the majority for upholding the rule "without explaining or
even articulating the underlying assumption: that a commercial
speaker can claim First Amendment protection for particular instances
of prohibited commercial speech, even where the prohibitory law
satisfied Central Hudson. "166
C. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.
In contrast to Discovery Network and Edenfield, the Court
permitted a restriction on commercial speech in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.167 There, a radio station brought a constitutional
challenge to a federal statute and accompanying federal regulations
that prohibited broadcasters licensed in states that forbid lotteries
from broadcasting lottery advertising.
1 68
The challenge at issue was brought by Edge Broadcasting,
which owns and operates a radio station located in the northern part
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1804.
'6' Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1804 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'"Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
'6 Id. at 1805.
166 id.
'67 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
16' Id. at 2700.
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of North Carolina.169 Over ninety percent of the station's listening
audience reside in Virginia, while less than ten percent live in North
Carolina. 70 Yet because the station is licensed in North Carolina-a
state that outlaws lotteries-it is forbidden by federal statute from
broadcasting advertisements for the Virginia lottery. 7'
The district court found that the statute and accompanying
FCC regulations violated the First Amendment, because they failed
the third prong of the four-prong Central Hudson test. According to
the district court, the statute as applied to Edge did not directly
advance the government's interest, and therefore could not withstand
constitutional challenge. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.' The Supreme
Court, in one of Justice White's final opinions, reversed 7-2.
The lower courts both examined the third prong of Central
Hudson-whether the statute directly advances the government's
interest-by determining whether, as applied to Edge, the
government's interest was advanced. The Supreme Court, however,
suggested that this was the wrong inquiry. "Even if there were no
advancement as applied in that manner," the majority stated, "there
would remain the matter of the regulation's general application to
others-in this case, to all other radio and television stations in North
Carolina and countrywide. "'73 This was not to say, the Court added,
that the validity as applied to Edge is irrelevant, but simply that the
particular application should be examined under the fourth prong of
Central Hudson, which asks whether the regulation is more extensive
than necessary to serve the government's interest.
Having thus decided that the analysis of whether the
government's interest was directly advanced could be examined at a
greater level of generality, the Court went on to find that the statute
did, in fact, serve the government's interest. Yet this determination
169 Id.
170 id. at 2702.
17 Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2702.
11 Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992). The Supreme
Court noted that "[w]e deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as applied,
the court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an unpublished per curiam
opinion." Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2703 n.3.
,13 Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704.
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appeared to turn on the unique characterization of the government's
interest in the case. According to the Court, Congress' interest was
not to discourage lotteries or lottery advertisements. Instead, it was
a policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery States 74
by forbidding stations in nonlottery states from carrying such ads,
even though such stations' signals would clearly reach elsewhere, but
not unduly interfering with lottery states, even though signals from
stations in such states would clearly reach nonlottery states like North
Carolina."'5 It was this "balancing" interest, the Court held, that was
served by applying the anti-lottery ad restriction to all stations in
North Carolina.
The Court looked at the fourth prong of Central Hudson and
considered whether the restriction was more extensive than necessary
to serve the government's interest. Here, the Court noted that "'the
validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the
overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to
which it furthers the government's interest in an individual case.'"76
Therefore, the Court is to "judge the validity of the restriction in this
case by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating
the policies of both lottery and nonlottery states, not by the extent to
which it furthers the Government's interest in an individual case." 177
That being the case, the Court concluded that the restriction was no
more extensive than necessary to serve this interest. 178
The Court went on to point out its disagreement with the
lower courts' findings that, "as applied to Edge itself, the restriction
at issue was ineffective and gave only remote support to the
Government's interest.""' 7 In doing so, it addressed the fact that
those who live in the eleven northern North Carolina counties served
by Edge are inundated by lottery advertising coming from Virginia-
based broadcasters.' According to both lower courts, this fact made
174 Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704.
175 Id.
116 Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
801 (1989)).
'7' Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2705.
' Id. at 2702.
'79 Id. at 2706.
180 Id.
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the government restriction "ineffective," and it therefore did not
directly serve the government's interest in supporting North
Carolina's anti-gambling policy."'1  The exposure to Virginia
broadcasters and newspapers, the lower courts found, was
"sufficiently pervasive to prevent the restriction on Edge from
furnishing any more than ineffective or remote support for the
statutory purpose."18 2  The Supreme Court disagreed, however,
noting that "Congress clearly was entitled to determine that broadcast
of promotional advertising of lotteries undermines North Carolina's
policy against gambling, even if the North Carolina audience is not
wholly unaware of the lottery's existence." '"13
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred in the
Court's judgment, but wrote separately to suggest that the Court's
analysis of the appropriate level of generality was dicta."' Because
the regulation, in Justice Souter's view, was constitutional even as
applied to Edge itself, he wrote that it was "unnecessary to decide
whether the restriction might appropriately be reviewed at a more
lenient level of generality. "18'
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, strongly
dissented. 86 He relied on the Court's decision in Bigelow v.
Virginia,187 where the Court struck down a pre-Roe v. Wade Virginia
law that forbade advertising for abortion-illegal in Virginia-as
applied to an advertisement offering abortions in New York, where
they were legal. 88 That case, according to Justice Stevens, was not
about abortion, but about "paternalism and informational
protectionism. "' 89 It is "about one State's interference with its
"' Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2706.
182 Id.
83 Id. at 2706. Justice White, in a section of his opinion joined only by three other
Justices, further noted that if the Court were to accept the narrower analysis that Edge
urged-looking at whether the restriction as applied only to Edge had a "reasonable fit"
to a substantial governmental interest-the result would be to "vitiate the Government's
ability generally to accommodate States with differing policies." Id.
I4 Id. at 2708 (Souter, J., concurring).
's Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2708.
' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
I id. at 829.
"9 Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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citizens' fundamental right to travel in a state of enlightenment, not
government-induced ignorance. "'90 According to Justice Stevens, the
First Amendment principle in Bigelow rendered the restrictions in
Edge unconstitutional.
As Justice Stevens also suggested, the majority opinion in
Edge appears inconsistent with the principle in Discovery Network
that there must be a reasonable fit between the distinction drawn
between prohibited and non-prohibited conduct and the interest
served. This surely would not have been a problem if the
government's asserted interest was to discourage lotteries; whether a
radio station is in a lottery or non-lottery state has little if anything
to do with promoting that interest. The majority sought to avoid this
problem by characterizing the interest as balancing the concerns of
lottery and nonlottery states. But as the Court itself observed in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board, such a characterization is little more than a "circular
defense" which "can sidestep judicial review of almost any statute,
because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored." 9 ' Indeed, in
Discovery Network itself, the city could have argued that its interest
was to "balance" aesthetic with informational concerns, and that a
ban on commercial newsracks served such an interest. The apparent
tension between Edge and cases such as Discovery Network and
Bigelow remains for future resolution by the Court.
IlL. Other First Amendment Decisions
A. Wisconsin v. Mitchell
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled
that a state may enhance punishment for raciallymotivated assault or
property damage. 192 This was notwithstanding the Court's unanimous
ruling one year earlier in R.A. V. v. St. Paul invalidating a so-called
"hate speech" ordinance.1 93  The Court's decision in Mitchell,
"g Id. (citation omitted).
'9' 112 S. Ct. at 512.
" Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
19 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
ill
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particularly in relation to R.A. V., has important implications for First
Amendment jurisprudence.
On the evening of October 7, 1989, a group of young
African-American men were gathered at an apartment complex in
Kenosha, Wisconsin. After discussing a scene from the movie
Mississippi Burning, Todd Mitchell asked the group, "Do you all feel
hyped up to move on some white people?"' 4  The group, at
Mitchell's urging, then attacked a young white boy walking down the
street. 95 The boy was rendered unconscious and remained in a coma
for several days.' 96
Following a jury trial, Mitchell was convicted of aggravated
battery.'97 In Wisconsin, "a conviction for that offense typically
carries a maximum punishment of two years imprisonment. "'9 But
because the jury found that Mitchell selected his victim based on his
race, the maximum possible sentence for the offense was enhanced
by five years.' 99 Of a possible seven years imprisonment, Mitchell
was sentenced to four.200
Mitchell appealed his conviction and sentence, based on First
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the constitutionality of
Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement scheme. 20' The Wisconsin Court
'94 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2196-97 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, (No. 92-515)).
195 Id.
'96 Id. at 2197.
,9 Id. (citing Wis. STAT. §§ 939.05, 940.19(lm)(1989-90)).
19 Id. (citing Wis. STAT. §§ 940.19(lm), 939.50(3)(e) (1989-90)).
199 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197 (citing Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-90)
(amended 1991)). That provision enhances the maximum penalty for certain offenses
when a person
[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par.
(a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or
otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) because of race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property.
Id. at 2197 n.1.
200 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2196.
' Id. The Supreme Court noted that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
Mitchell had waived his equal protection claim, and rejected outright Mitchell's
vagueness challenges. Mitchell attempted to renew his Fourteenth Amendment claims
in his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court declined to hear them. For this
reason, Mitchell was decided solely on First Amendment grounds. id. at 2197 n.2.
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of Appeals rejected Mitchell's challenge on First Amendment
grounds.2"2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
statute "violates the First Amendment directly by punishing what the
legislature has deemed to be offensive thought."2 3 Relying on
R.A. V., the Wisconsin court stated, "the Wisconsin legislature cannot
criminalize bigoted thought with which it disagrees. "2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously
reversed, rejecting each of Mitchell's arguments. Initially, Mitchell
maintained that the Court was bound by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's construction of the state statute rendering it unconstituional. 2 5
The Supreme Court agreed that it would be bound by a state supreme
court's definition of "the meaning of a particular statutory word or
phrase," but not by the state supreme court's words in this case. 2"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "[mierely because the
statute refers in a literal sense to the intentional 'conduct' of selecting
[a victim], does not mean the court must turn a blind eye to the intent
and practical effect of the law-punishment of motive or thought. 20 7
The Supreme Court seized on the "practical effect" language to
distinguish the Wisconsin court's interpretation from that of
traditional statutory construction. 2 8 The Court concluded that it can
appropriately characterize the "practical effect" of the statute, and is
not bound by the state supreme court's contrary conclusion." °
Next, the Court explained that the conduct at issue in Mitchell
should not be considered "speech" for purposes of the First
Amendment.2"0 The Court distinguished its holding in Mitchell from
0 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
2 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992).
2 Id. at 815.
25 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769
(1982) and Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
SId.
207 Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 813 (emphasis added).
2 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198.
2 Id. at 2199.
210 Id.
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that in United States v. O'Brien and its progeny."' Citing Roberts v.
Jaycees2 2 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,213 the Court
concluded that "a physical assault is not by any stretch of the
imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. 
214
This lack of First Amendment protection for a violent expressive act,
however, does not adequately dispose of the contention that penalty-
enhancement statutes punish the underlying thought or motive.215
Mitchell accordingly argued that the Wisconsin statutory scheme
amounts to punishment for the offender's beliefs.21 6
The Supreme Court disposed of the "punishment of speech"
argument with two analogies: (1) that punishment enhancement for
biased victim selection is equivalent to the traditional consideration
in criminal sentencing of a wide variety of aggravating factors; and
(2) that motive plays the same role in punishment enhancement as it
does under federal antidiscrimination laws.21 7
First, the Court compared punishment enhancement to
sentencing considerations. 1 8 Just as a sentencing judge may consider
the motive of pecuniary gain as an aggravating circumstance under
the federal capital-sentencing statute, the Court reasoned, so also may
a judge consider racial animus. 219  Following its own holding in
Dawson v. Delaware,220 the Court stated:
211 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); accord R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Spencev. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(striking down a state statute prohibiting flag burning).
112 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (holding that "violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact
...are entitled to no constitutional protection.").
213 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1983) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect
violence).
214 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
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[A] defendant's abstract beliefs, however obnoxious
to most people, may not be taken into consideration
by a sentencing judge . . .. [However] "the
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the
admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and
associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs
and associations are protected by the First
Amendment."22'
While abstract beliefs alone are not enough to warrant penalty
enhancement, the Court reasoned that racial bias may be considered
if it is related to the offense. 222 Mitchell argued that Dawson and
Barclay v. Florida223 were inapposite because those cases did not deal
with penalty-enhancement statutes.224 The Court answered that "in
Barclay we held that it was permissible for the sentencing court to
consider the defendant's racial animus in determining whether he
should be sentenced to death, surely the most severe 'enhancement'
of all."225  The Court further explained that the Wisconsin
legislature's enactment of harsher penalties "across the board" is well
within its powers.226 Second, the Court explained that "motive" plays
the same role in punishment-enhancement statutes that it does under
federal antidiscrimination laws. 227 Citing R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
2
1
as an example, the Court reasoned that Title VII is an example of
"permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct" that does not
infringe employers' First Amendment rights.229 If it is permissible to
penalize an employer for firing an employee "because of" race or
2, Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1094 (emphasis
added)).
2 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
221 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (allowing sentencing judge to consider the defendant's
membership in the Black Liberation Army and his desire to provoke a race war, where
such facts were "related to" the murder).




2m 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992).
' Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
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other characteristics, the Court explained, it is similarly permissible
to penalize a criminal for selecting a victim "because of" race.230
Based on this speech/conduct distinction, the Court
specifically distinguished its holding in R.A. V. from Mitchell:
"[Whereas the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly
directed at expression (i.e. "speech" or "messages"), the statute in
this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. "
The Court went on to discuss the negative effects of bias-motivated
crimes, and concluded that "[tihe State's desire to redress these
perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-
enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with
offenders' beliefs or biases. 
23 2
Finally, the Court turned to Mitchell's overbreadth attack on
the Wisconsin statute.233  Mitchell argued that the penalty
enhancement statute would have a chilling effect on free speech.234
The Court found "no merit" in Mitchell's contention that the statute
was overbroad because a defendant's prior statements might later be
offered as evidence that he selected his victim by one of the
proscribed criteria. 235 The Court rejected the chilling effect argument
as too "attenuated" and "simply too speculative. ,236
Hate crime sentencing enhancement statutes, particularly if not
properly drafted and administered, present real dangers to First
Amendment and due process freedoms. Such issues are currently
being debated by Congress as it considers the proposed federal Hate
Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act.237
230 Id.
21 Id. at 2201 (citations omitted).
232 Id. The Court explained, relying on the State and its amici, that "bias-motivated
crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on
their victims, and incite community unrest." Id.
23 Id.
234 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
235 ld.
I,' Id. at 2201. The Court also noted that the First Amendment does not prohibit the
evidentiary use of prior statements to prove motive or intent. The Court relied on Haupt
v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947), a decision involving treason, where it held that
evidence of prior conversations was admissible to prove motive. Id.
27 H.R. 1152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993).
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As originally drafted, the proposed federal statute authorized
enhanced punishment where a defendant's conduct is "motivated by
hatred, bias or prejudice" based on race or other characteristics, as
opposed to the more specific Wisconsin standard that looks to
whether the victim was selected "because of" race or other
characteristics.238 The vagueness of the original bill could open the
door for penalty enhancement based on any prior statements,
associations, and possibly even reading material in the possession of
the offender. One news comment shortly after the Mitchell decision
pointed out the dangers of such investigations:
A jury might well be more likely to convict a
defendant of a hate crime if his library consisted of a
well-thumbed copy of 'Mein Kampf-or, to look
down the slippery slope only a bit farther, a tellingly
highlighted copy of something by Randall Terry or
Pat Buchanan or Malcolm X. The prospect of such
inquiries by the police is one that civil libertarians
correctly call chilling.239
Just as important are the problems of equal application of
sentence enhancement provisions and the protection of defendants'
due process rights. While the Wisconsin statute affords the defendant
the full evidentiary and procedural protections of a trial before
enhancement can be ordered, the initial version of the proposed
federal statute did not. If the determination whether enhancement is
warranted is left solely to the sentencing stage, as initially proposed,
the judge would be free to consider any extraneous, hearsay, or
previously suppressed evidence, and the defendant would not
necessarily be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine. These
procedural deficiencies may be compounded by the danger of unequal
application of hate crime laws. For example, in Wisconsin, where
less than one-tenth of the population is non-white, half the defendants
in hate-crimes cases have been minorities. 4
3 Compare Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1993) with H.R. 1152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1993).
239 Bad Motives, NEW YORKER, June 21, 1993, at 4, 6.
240 Id.
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Even with the procedural and substantive protections of laws
like the Wisconsin statute, therefore, careful prosecutorial judgments
and sound evidentiary rulings from the bench are still necessary to
prevent abuses. , While Mitchell clearly helps resolve the
constitutional issues posed by such statutes, further controversies on
this subject are likely to emerge in the halls of federal and state
legislatures, and in the courts.
B. Alexander v. United States
In Alexander v. United States,"4 the Court held that the
forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 2 as applied to an obscenity conviction,
do not violate the First Amendment, but that such forfeiture may
constitute an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.
Ferris J. Alexander was convicted on seventeen counts of
obscenity and three counts of violating RICO. The obscenity
convictions were based on the jury's finding that four magazines and
three videotapes sold at Alexander's stores were obscene. u3 At the
conclusion of the criminal trial, Alexander was sentenced to a total
of six years in prison and was assessed a fine of $100,000.2' In
addition to the prison term and fine, the court ordered the forfeiture
of Alexander's wholesale and retail businesses and almost nine
million dollars in moneys accumulated from those businesses.4
Following confiscation, the government destroyed the forfeited
expressive materials.246
241 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
'42 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
243 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769.
2"4 Id.
24' Id. at 2769-70. The forfeiture proceedings were carried out pursuant to § 1963
(a)(2) of RICO. The Government sought forfeiture of the businesses and real estate
which represented the convicted person's interest in the racketeering enterprise, under
§ 1963 (a)(2)(A), the property that afforded the convicted person influence over the
racketeering enterprise, under §§ 1963 (a)(2)(D), and the assets and proceeds obtained
from his racketeering offenses, under § 1963 (a)(1), (3). Id.
'4" Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770 n.1.
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. Alexander appealed on the grounds that the RICO forfeiture
provisions represent a prior restraint on speech, are overbroad, and
that they violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
excessive fines. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
forfeiture order, rejecting Alexander's First and Eighth Amendment
challenges.247
Writing for a majority of six Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist
distinguished RICO forfeiture provisions from prior restraint
schemes, thus affirming that part of the Court of Appeals decision. 8
Alexander argued that the forfeiture operated in the same way as the
injunction prohibiting the publication of expressive material found to
be a prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota.249 But the majority
disagreed, stating that to analogize the forfeiture imposed in
Alexander's case with an injunction enjoining future speech "stretches
the term 'prior restraint' well beyond the limits established by our
cases," and would "virtually obliterate the distinction . . . between
prior restraints and subsequent punishments. "250 The Court noted that
while RICO forfeiture might make future expression more difficult
for Alexander, it neither forbids it nor requires Alexander to obtain
prior approval for any such activity. The Court held that there was
"no legal impediment" to Alexander's ability to engage in expressive
activity, only a prohibition against the use of tainted assets in that
expression. 25 '
As to Alexander's argument that there had been no proper
judicial determination of obscenity prior to confiscation, the majority
explained that RICO is blind to the expressive or non-expressive
nature of the forfeited material.252 Furthermore, the majority
247 Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1991).
m Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
249 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating a permanent injunction, premised on a prior
violation of a state nuisance statute, prohibiting the future publication of any "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory" articles); accord Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415 (1971) (vacating an order enjoining the distribution of leaflets anywhere
in town); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam)
(striking down permanent injunction against screening of future films based on showing
that obscene films had been screened in past).
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maintained that a requirement of prior judicial determination of
obscenity would be "disastrous from a policy standpoint, enabling
racketeers to evade forfeiture by investing the proceeds of their
crimes in businesses engaging in expressive activity. "253
Finally, the majority concluded that Alexander's proposed
definition of prior restraint would "undermine the time-honored
distinction between barring future speech and penalizing past
speech."2 Noting that the First Amendment has been read broadly
to protect against prior restraint on speech, the Court reiterated that
"the First Amendment does not prohibit either stringent criminal
sanctions for obscenity offenses or forfeiture of expressive materials
as punishment for criminal conduct."25' Alexander argued that
RICO's forfeiture provisions are overbroad because they reach
materials not determined to be obscene. The Court rejected this
argument, however, noting that the RICO statute does not criminalize
protected speech. Instead, the Court characterized Alexander's "real
complaint" as alleging that the forfeiture provisions, when applied to
expressive materials, may have an unconstitutional "chilling effect"
on others wishing to sell similar matter.2"6
Following its decision in Austin v. United States,257 however,
the Court remanded to the Court of Appeals the question of whether
23 Id. at 2772. Justice Souter disagreed with the majority on this point, and agreed
with the dissent that a prior judicial determination of obscenity is necessary. Id. at 2776
(Souter, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2773.
" Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2773. The majority relied on Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), where the Court upheld the closure of a bookstore based on
a finding that it was being used as a place of prostitution. Even though the Court in
Arcara specifically found no prior restraint because the proprietors could move their
bookselling business elsewhere and found no need for advance judicial determination
because the closure order was based on prostitution and not the sale of expressive
material, 478 U.S. at 705 n.2, the Alexander majority declined to distinguish Arcara on
such grounds.
25 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774. In disposing of this "chilling effect" argument,
the Court relied on Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989), for the
proposition that "the threat of forfeiture has no more of a chilling effect on free
expression than the threat of a prison term or a large fine." Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at
2774.
2" 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding that Eighth Amendment prohibition against
excessive fines applies to criminal laws imposing monetary forfeitures).
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the forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment.258 Alexander argued that forfeiture of his entire
business was excessive, considering that only seven items had been
found to be obscene. The Court, however, instructed that the proper
measure of proportionality should not be based on the number of
articles found to be obscene, but should be considered in light of the
extent of the racketeering enterprise.25 9
Justice Kennedy, in a vigorous dissent joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, attacked the majority's opinion on several
fronts. 2" Initially, the dissent explained that the "fundamental defect
in the majority's reasoning is a failure to recognize that the forfeiture
here cannot be equated with traditional punishments such as fines and
jail terms. "26  The purpose of the RICO forfeiture provisions, as
designed by Congress, is to take aim at the economic roots of
organized crime.262 The dissent argued that this purpose, and the
broad sweep of forfeiture provisions, endanger expressive material in
a potentially draconian manner that is inconsistent with First
Amendment principles.263 Specifically, when Congress amended
RICO in 1984 to include obscenity offenses, "the result was to render
vulnerable to government destruction any business daring to deal in
sexually explicit materials." 2 The dissent adamantly disagreed with
the majority's characterization of forfeiture as analogous to a criminal
fine. Instead, the dissent argued that the constitutionality of
governmental destruction of protected expressive materials is distinct
from the concerns raised by traditional punishments.265
In addition, the dissent attacked the majority's holding that the
RICO forfeiture scheme does not amount to prior restraint:
M Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776.
259 1d.
' Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
6' Id. at 2777.
1 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969)).
2 Id. at 2779.
26Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2778.
' Id. at 2784. The dissent maintained that Arcara and Fort Wayne Books were not
dispositive and that the majority failed to confront the "pervasive danger of government
censorship" inherent in RICO's forfeiture scheme. Nor, the dissent argued, can the
temporary closure of a bookstore in Arcara be equated with the confiscation and
destruction of expressive materials in Alexander. Id.
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The admitted design and the overt purpose of the
forfeiture in this case are to destroy an entire speech
business and all its protected titles, thus depriving the
public of access to lawful expression. This is
restraint in more than theory. It is censorship all too
real. 26
The dissent argued that the majority's distinction between prior
restraint and subsequent punishment is too rigid, and does not allow
for necessary and traditional adjustments in First Amendment
jurisprudence to protect speech from unwarranted government
intrusion.267 Citing Near v. Minnesota'" and Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan,6 9 the dissent noted that past decisions have not looked
simply at the form of punishment, but also at its substance and
effect.27 Where the "operation and effect" of a particular
enforcement scheme is to burden free speech, the dissent maintained,
the same concerns arise as are present in prior restraint cases.7
Additionally, the operation and effect of RICO forfeiture provisions
differ from a heavy fine or jail sentence because the government's
stated purpose is to incapacitate the offending enterprise.272 The
dissent concluded that "constitutional analysis [of forfeiture] must be
different when that remedy is imposed for violations of the federal
obscenity laws" '273 due to the "'collateral effect of inhibiting freedom
of expression. ",274
The dissent also maintained that the majority had improperly
permitted the confiscation and destruction of First Amendment
2m Id. at 2779.
2Id.
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (finding a permanent injunction based upon speech violative
of the First Amendment).
2 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (holding that an administrative warning to booksellers that
certain titles could be held obscene, without the ability to impose a "legal impediment"
on them, constituted an impermissible "system of prior administrative restraints.").
2'0 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2781-82.
27 Id. at 2783.
2M Id.
2n id.
27" Id. at 2783 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-151 (1959)).
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materials without a prior judicial determination of obscenity." 5
Relying on Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, which have
ruled that even allegedly obscene materials cannot be seized without
safeguards such as prior judicial determination of obscenity, the
dissent argued that the same constitutional principle invalidates the
RICO forfeiture scheme, which makes no preseizure determination of
obscenity .276
Alexander clearly represents an expansion of government
power under RICO and similar statutes to pursue alleged obscenity,
even if arguably at the expense of protected expression. If a
bookstore owner can lose his or her business and nine million dollars
because four magazines and three videotapes are later found to be
obscene,277 there is little question that a "chilling effect" causing
many to steer clear of possibly protected expression will result. 278 As
the dissent made clear, both the result and underlying reasoning of
Alexander appear in conflict with First Amendment principles . 7 9
C. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico
In El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico,28° the Supreme
Court reversed a Puerto Rico Supreme Court holding that allowed a
preliminary criminal hearing to remain closed to the public. The case
arose when a reporter for El Vocero de Puerto Rico, the
Commonwealth's largest newspaper, sought admittance to
275Id. at 2785-86.
276 Id. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,326 n.5 (1979) (ruling that
the First Amendment imposes special restrictions on searches for and seizures of
presumptively protected materials); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-733
(1961) (invalidating a pretrial seizure of allegedly obscene publications where safeguards
were insufficient to protect nonobscene materials); A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (invalidating a state procedure of seizing allegedly obscene
printed material prior to hearing even where judicial determination of obscenity made
for some of the materials).
27 Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
" Robert R. Strang, "She Was Just Seventeen... And The Way She Looked Was
Way Beyond [Her Years]", 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1779, 1784 n.39 (1990).
279 See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776-86.
280 113 S. Ct. 2004 (1993).
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preliminary hearings or access to taped recordings of the hearings. 81
The trial court denied access based on Puerto Rico Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(c), which states that preliminary hearings shall be held
privately unless the defendant requests otherwise.28 2
After both requests were denied, the newspaper sought a
declaration that the privacy provision of Rule 23(c) violates the First
Amendment, and an injunction against the enforcement of the rule.
As authority, the newspaper relied on Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court,2" 3 which struck down a similar California privacy
law. The California law was invalidated on the grounds that criminal
preliminary hearings have traditionally been open to the public and
that, because they are substantially similar to a trial, public access is
vital to their proper functioning. 2 '
A divided Supreme Court of Puerto Rico affirmed the
dismissal of the newspaper's complaint, and found that Press-
Enterprise did not control.285 The court stressed the differences
between the California and Puerto Rico hearings, and concluded that
the closed hearings were compatible with the history and traditions of
the Commonwealth.286
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, stating
that the distinctions drawn by the Puerto Rico court between the
California and Puerto Rico preliminary hearings were
"insubstantial. ,2 7 The Court found under Press-Enterprise, that the
preliminary hearings are sufficiently like a trial to require public
access.28" The Court noted that the similarity between the Puerto
Rico and California hearings was not coincidental; the drafters of the
Puerto Rico rule relied in part on the California law at issue in Press-
28' Id. at 2005.
P.R. ANN. tit. 34, app. II, Rule 23 (1991).
.. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
2 El Vocero, 113 S. Ct. at 2005.
Id.
2I6 d. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico noted that the Commonwealth's history
and tradition of closed preliminary hearings was based on a special concern for citizens'
privacy and the potential prejudice to the defendant due to the small size and dense
population of the island. Id.
287 id.
25 Id.
1993] SUPREME COURT 1992-93 TERM 125
Enterprise.289 Because of the overwhelming similarities, the Court
characterized the Puerto Rico law as a "subspecies" of the California
law invalidated in Press-Enterprise.2 9 Furthermore, the California
law that allowed the hearing to be closed on a showing of "substantial
likelihood of prejudice to the defendant" had been found to be
"insufficiently exacting to protect public access" to the hearings.
291
By contrast, the Court noted, the Puerto Rico rule allowed closure at
the request of the defendant alone.292
The Court also held that reliance upon the Puerto Rican
tradition of heightened privacy was misplaced, 293 and represented a
misreading of the principle in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court294 that the "tests of experience and logic" are to be used in
resolving such cases.295 Citing the First Circuit decision in Rivera-
Puig v. Garcia-Rosario,9 the Court explained that the Globe test
does not look at the particular experience or customs of one
jurisdiction, but at the experience with that type of hearing throughout
the United States. 297  The Court concluded that this country's
widespread practice and tradition of open preliminary hearings
controls the Puerto Rico situation.298
Finally, the Court reiterated the test for determining whether
a preliminary hearing should be closed to protect the defendant's right
to a fair trial.299 Quoting its own opinion in Press-Enterprise, the
Court stated that specific findings must be made that there is a
289Id. at 2006. The Court further noted that the all of the elements relied on in
Press-Enterprise were present in the Puerto Rico scheme of preliminary hearings: a
neutral magistrate; right to counsel, cross-examination, testimony on suppression of
illegally seized evidence; accused bound over only upon a finding of probable cause; no
jury present; and no other ordinary occasion for public observation of the criminal
justice system. Id.
2W Id.
"' Id. (citing Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 14-15).
2 El Vocero, 113 S. Ct. at 2006.
" Id.
457 U.S. 596 (1982).
295 El Vocero, 113 S. Ct. at 2006.
2 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992).
El Vocero, 113 S. Ct. at 2006.
Id. (citing Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 10-11 & nn.3-4).
El Vocero, 113 S. Ct. at 2006.
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substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity and that reasonable alternatives to closure will
not adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights."°
I d. (citing Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S., at 14).
